In this paper, we propose a new SystemC-based 
Introduction
Electronic systems reliability is a growing concern in deep sub-micron, in particular due to increased errors due to higher integration and packing density. SystemC is highlevel design language with potential improvements in design productivity by allowing the designer to operate at higher-or mixed-levels of abstraction than available with traditional RT-level synthesis tools, such as VHDL or Verilog. An important aspect in the development of such electronic systems is how to validate the feasibility of faultrobust design in an early phase to reduce the re-design cost. Existing fault injection (FI) tools have been mainly VHDL based, most of these have been limited to RT-levels [1] . For large and complex systems, fault injection using these techniques require time-consuming re-design and validations, which can be greatly simplified using SystemC [2, 3] . With growing interest in SystemC-based development, simple, minimum intrusive, and fast fault injection technique with fault access and representation in all visible registers is much needed.
Existing SystemC-based fault injection techniques reported in [4, 5, 6 ] are saboteur and mutant based, which have poor fault access and representation in different data and signal registers and also has highly intrusive and time consuming re-design technique for fault injection. Recently reported techniques in [3, 2] have poor fault access for different data and signal types due to signal type restrictions. In this paper, we present a minimum intrusive and fast SystemC-based FI technique implemented in a prototype simulator that works by replacing data and signal types to equivalent FI enabler types. The proposed FI technique, thus, achieves very high fault access and representation for all visible and on-the-fly registers. Similar approach to simulation modeling for design space exploration was reported in [7] .
Existing Fault Injection Techniques
Existing simulated FI techniques are based on saboteurs, mutants or simulation command-based approach [1] . SystemC-based FI techniques using emulation approach (such as [8] ) is outside the scope of this paper due to our focus on simulated FI approach. In the following, existing simulated FI techniques are described.
Saboteurs and Mutants
Saboteur is a special component added between signal drivers and receivers to alter their value or timing characteristics when a fault is injected [1] . Due to signal based approach, saboteurs have no access to data registers, such as variable and on-the-fly registers [9] . Also, for designs with large number of signals, saboteurs have limited practical application. To ease such re-design,VHDL-based saboteur libraries are proposed in [1] and automatic saboteur insertion technique was proposed in [10] . However, for multilevel abstractions, such techniques are not practical due to poor fault access and highly intrusive design modifications. Saboteur-based FI using SystemC is presented in [4] and distributed saboteur-like fault injection controllers are shown in [5] .
On the other hand, a mutant is a component description that replaces another component description. Mutants can be accomplished either by adding saboteurs to structural or behavioural component descriptions, or by mutating structural component descriptions or behavioural components to achieve complex and detailed fault models [1] . Similar to saboteurs, mutants require time consuming re-writing or conversions, and therefore, mutant-based re-design can become complex for large designs. SystemC-based external signal manipulation for fault simulation has been carried out in [6] , showing attack based fault scenarios and using fault insertion models more like mutant based designs.
Simulation Command
Simulation command-based approach, which is employed in this paper, is a powerful and minimum intrusive way to inject faults via variable or signal manipulation [1] . Recently, SystemC simulation command-based approach have been reported by [2, 3] , which employ the introduction of extra values within SystemC type sc logic to control stuck-at-faults, which are sc logic A meaning a stuck-at-1, sc logic B meaning a stuck-at-0, and sc logic R meaning reset for stuck-at faults. However, in behavioural models involving different variable and signal types, restriction to only sc logic or its array type sc lv<N> may require programming effort and conversions. Often such conversions are not feasible for primitive types, such as float and SystemC types, such as sc fixed<..>. Hence, simulation command-based approaches [2, 3] for FI have limited access to fault injection for such systems.
Proposed Fault Injection Technique
The proposed fault insertion technique has three major components as shown in a prototype simulator in Fig. 1 : the database of possible fault locations, fault policy manager (FPM) and finally and the fault injection manager (FIM). The system clock is connected to the FIM (Fig. 1) 
Database of Possible Fault Locations
The proposed FI technique works by automated creation and update of database of possible fault locations, initiated by replacing the original data and signal register types to the FI enabler types shown in Table 3 .1 (most commonly used C++/SystemC types shown but other types are also implemented). The FI enabler types ( 
Fault Policy Manager
Fault policy manager (FPM) represents the second component of the proposed FI technique (Fig 1) and controls the location and probability of fault injection from the toplevel module or testbench. In Fig. 3 , overview of FPM, FIPolicy, is shown with some member functions. While setProbability(..) and setProbabilityType(..) set the probability and its associated type for the fault injection, getFaultLength(..) and getFaultLocation(..) return to the FIM the associated search length and fault location within the available bit space within the list of data or signal registers as possible fault locations. Different fault types (stuck-at, SEU, delay or indetermination) can be set by setFaultType(..) and current fault type can be returned by getFaultType(..). Random number generation using different probability distribution is managed with the help of GNU scientific library. 
Fault Injection Manager
Fault injection manager (FIM) is the third and main module that interfaces with the FPM to inject faults within the database of possible fault locations. In order to sample fault insertion time into discrete fault probability in bitspace, system clock of the top-level module/testbench is connected to the FIM (for homogeneous, single-clock systems) by SystemC statement SystemC description of the FIM module, FIManager, is shown in Fig. 4 with main FI function insert faults. For single or concurrent multiple fault injection or clearance, the list of possible fault locations (mylist) is searched for given search length (fault length) and fault location, (fault loc), fed back by the FPM (Fig. 4) . For all search lengths, the search space is translated in the available bit space by N simulation clock cycles (with N − 1 wait cycles, followed by an iteration cycle), which is given by This gives one list iteration within the fault locations' database per clock cycle for single fault injection or two list iterations for two faults' injection and so on. The registers in the list within the database, mylist, are converted to their original types and size within the FIM and different types of faults are implemented with appropriate operations replaced in bold commented place in insert faults (Fig. 4) 
Motivations and Comparisons
In this section, we demonstrate the capabilities of the proposed FI technique and compare it with saboteur, mutant and simulation command-based approach (such as [3] ). Using the motivational SystemC example setup, the following comparisons are carried out.
Comparison 1: Simplicity and Intrusiveness
Inclusion of saboteurs or mutating behavioural descriptions in saboteur or mutant-based approaches require direct intrusion into the description and are not suitable for higheror mixed-level systems (Sec. 2.1). The proposed technique employs powerful simulation command-based approach and can be applied to a design with minimum intrusion, similar to [3] . To demonstrate and facilitate comparison of simplicity and intrusion, first a block diagram of a synchronous 8-bit counter and a SystemC description of the same is presented in Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b) . SystemC descriptions using [3] and our proposed technique are presented in Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b) .
Using observational comparison among the SystemC descriptions in Fig. 5 and 6 , it can be seen that the proposed technique (Fig. 6(b) ) requires replacement of original types bool and sc uint<8> (Fig. 5(b) ) to their equivalent FI enabler types (from Table 3 .1) Reg<bool> and UIntReg<8> (marked block 1 in Fig. 5(b) ), requiring inclusion of proposed type definitions' header file FIReg.h (marked block 2 in Fig. 5(b) ). The simulation commandbased approach [3] requires these types to be converted to sc logic and sc lv<8> (Fig. 6(a) ) and using the extra types Fig. 6(a) to keep the functionalities similar.
Comparison 2: Fault Representation and Capabilities
Simulated FI approaches rely on perturbation of registers. These approaches are based on the fact that faults at the hardware level are propagated towards registers at higher abstraction levels (in data or signal registers), often referred to multiplicity. Although the effect of faults in the inaccessible registers is not negligible but it scales much in the similar way as the architected higher level registers that appear in HDL descriptions [9] . A desirable feature of a simulated FI technique is to have access to all visible data and signal registers of a model description for better fault access and representation [1] . Saboteurs and mutants, as described in Sec. 2.1, have poor access to variable manipulation and requires expensive re-design using manual or behavioural mutation to introduce fault injection. Simulation command-based approach [3] restricts types to sc logic and sc lv<N> only and has disadvantages as follows. Firstly, he value space in [3] increases to seven values from four (Section 2.2), with default value to 'X'. To avoid undesired initialisations in SystemC sc start(..) needs to be replaced by sc initialize and sc cycle (to control simulation cycles). Our proposed technique keeps the value space unchanged by simple replacement of types ( Fig. 6(c) ). and fault location is set manually by For non-directed fault injection, the member functions of FPM, setProbability(..) and setProbabilityType(..) are used within the testbench as described in Sec. 3.2 to access different fault types and their associated probabilities from testbench. Similar non-directed SystemC-based FI technique using saboteurs is reported in [4] . Fault injection technique in [3] can employ direct method only.
Comparison 3: Speed of Simulation
Speed of simulation is often used as a benchmark for simulator performance [9] . A D-type flip-flop (DFF) and a synchronous 8-bit counter were designed and simulated along with their testbenches using saboteur, mutant, simulation command-based approach [3] and the proposed technique for fault injection. The SystemC simulation times recorded as average elapsed time on RHEL 2.6.9-42 with Intel Pentium-4 CPU at 3.20GHz clock speed and 1GB RAM are shown in Fig. 7 for the following four cases: i) DFF for 5 SEUs/10000 clock cycles, ii) 8-bit counter for 5 SEUs/10000 clock cycles, iii) DFF for 5 stuck-at-0 faults/10000 clock cycles, and iv) 8-bit counter for 5 stuckat-0 faults/10000 clock cycles. As shown in Fig. 7 , the proposed technique has less simulation times than saboteurs and mutant based FI techniques by on average 12.76% and 25.42%, respectively for four test cases. The proposed technique and simulation command-based approach [3] have comparable simulation times with only 1.75% higher simulation time on average due to dynamic list building in possible fault locations' database.
MPEG-2 Decoder
In this section, we set up an MPEG-2 decoder to validate fault injection (SEUs only) abilities using the proposed technique (Fig. 1) . Due to type restrictions, such setup is not feasible by [3] (Sec. 2.2). To the best of our knowledge, no such setup using SystemC-based FI methods have been reported previously.
A cycle-accurate behavioural SystemC model for MPEG-2 video decoder was developed following [11] . To enable fault injections, all primitive C++ or SystemC data and signal types were replaced by FI enabler types (Table 3.1). Due to automatic registration and de-registration (Sec. 3.1), the list size (i.e. the sum of all register sizes within the database of possible fault locations) varies and is averaged over total simulation time of 41928 clock cycles as 49323 bits. Constants within pre-processor directives cannot be included by the proposed technique, which sum up as a approximate total of extra 568 bits. As such, up to 98.9% of visible and on-the-fly registers can be subjected to fault injection within MPEG-2 video decoder, giving it very high fault access and representation.
Different simulations were carried out with varied fault probabilities with uniform distribution within the bitspace for injecting SEUs within registers and memories of SystemC MPEG-2 decoder description. The simulations were recorded on Intel Pentium-4 CPU clocked at 3.20GHz system with 1GB RAM running SystemC on RHEL 2.6.9-42 to Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 8(b) . The total injected SEUs with corresponding simulation times is shown in Fig. 8(c) . No more than (1 × 10 −4 ) could be carried out due to early termination of application caused by faults injected.
It can be seen from Fig. 8(a) that the total SEUs injected varies almost proportionately with fault probability due to conversion of fault probability in bitspace into timespace (Sec. 3.3). However, the simulation times increase sharply (from 5ms to 50ms) when injected faults increase from 0 to 201 corresponding to fault probability increase from 0 to 5 × 10 −7 ( Fig. 8(a) and (b) ). As the fault probability increases, the simulation times gradually saturate due to faults injection on almost every clock cycle (Fig. 8(b) ). Referring to Fig. 8(c) , a total of 52371 and 87682 SEUs were injected over 41928 clock cycles with corresponding simulation times of 181ms and 217ms, respectively. The increase in the simulation times from fault-free case to faulty cases are generally expected and in this case the search times of fault locations in the list are also included. The simulations times are still low (in the order of ms) with the given advantage of 98.9% fault representation, minimum intrusive design by simple change of data types (Table. 3.1).
Conclusions
We have presented a new SystemC-based FI technique with improved fault representation using replacement of the original C++/SystemC types by proposed FI enabler types. In doing so the the functions are kept intact and design modifications are kept simple and less intrusive. Using example circuits, we have shown that the proposed technique has less or comparable simulation times as recently reported techniques. An MPEG-2 decoder based experimental setup is also presented to demonstrate the fault injection capabilities of the proposed technique in a high-level behavioural system. We have shown that our technique has 98.9% fault representation, acceptable speed of simulation and requires less modification to enable fault injection.
